

CIA: The Myth and the Madness

Chapter V
Technology: The Tail Wagging the Dog?

Pg. 95 -- U-2 incident was the beginning of "technical intelligence goofs" in the 1960's, prompting defensive attitude among intelligence leaders when called to task by President and Congress

Pg. 104-105 -- CIA agreed with judgment that Pueblo mission involved "minimal risk", whereas any honest assessment against existing criteria, public events and secret intelligence indicators would have led to its disapproval

Pg. 104-105 -- "Each unit above the first merely rubber stamps a recon proposal... I've seen this happen with U-2 overflights of China, SR-71 overflights of North Vietnam...."

Pg. 106 -- Recon schedule containing Pueblo mission involved 400 proposals and cleared in approximately three days -- author recounts CIA office experience with the phone book size monthly schedule -- "We didn't understand its computer language... The schedule didn't explain the risk categories which were identified by form letters... The collection guidance staff left it with us for 1 1/2 hours... we all ducked the chore of going through it."

Pg. 109 -- CIA scientific analysts involved in a long-standing feud with the intelligence community "over a mere two-tenths of a kilometer" difference in the range of SA-2's in North Vietnam which never affected actual U.S. flight operations.

Chapter VI
The Culture of Bureaucracy

Pg. 116 -- Author quotes Henry Howe Ransom, "Viewing CIA's impressive office buildings...notes Parkinson's law...architectural magnificence and comfort [are achieved] at point when institutional effectiveness declines...."

Pg. 117 -- CIA is protected from official and unofficial scrutiny and has devised seemingly sound argument to defend committee system and duplication of effort -- and those charged with looking into CIA problems never have opportunity to dig beneath surface to see the bureaucratic ineptness

Pg. 120 -- "Committees are nothing more than protective societies sent to CIA by their bosses to ensure that their organization [didn't] yield on sovereignty."

Pg. 129 -- Author gives example of instances where CIA protects vested interests where it has an ax to grind -- CIA promoted NIE that pacification doing poorly after "U.S. Army won its fight to take charge of pacification..." From early '60's until late '67 when CIA ran pacification there was not a single "things going poorly" estimate -- in connection with the Gulf of Tonkin, CIA left Pentagon in dark about its commando raids and maritime operations against North Vietnam which CIA began in the early 1960's -- FBI wanted to publicly discredit Stokely Carmichael in Hong Kong but CIA squelched idea because it would affect ongoing operations.

Pg. 129 -- CIA is in constant war in Hong Kong with forces of Communism and more directly, British Intelligence Service

Pg. 132 -- CIA has upper hand in interagency committees not because its men are smarter but because CIA men rarely transfer out of town, become skilled in conference techniques and outgun their service or State counterparts.

Chapter VI - Continued

Pg. 132 -- CIA intelligence production people normally assign their less competent officers to committees

Pg. 135 -- Uncovering glaring errors in MACV estimates of enemy troop strengths in SVN "allowed CIA to conclude that troop strengths are perhaps 120,000, not 221,000 -- on basis of documents purloined from military in Saigon --" CIA in 1967 believed enemy recruiting more from SVN villages than military did (U.S. military now in charge of pacification) and estimated strength at 360,000. War within a war with CIA staffers writing "contact reports" every time they had beer with G.I.

Pg. 136 -- By November 1967, MACV, with complicated "crossover point" thesis, estimated enemy strength at 260,000 -- CIA 500,000.

(NIE summary of 1967 said strength from 200,000 to 300,000 with two page footnote that it could be as high as 500,000 or as low as 180,000.)

Pg. 137 -- Had strength estimates been more realistic in 1966, policy makers would have realized that more could have been achieved with 20,000 fewer American deaths by defending populous coastal area.

Intelligence performance of troop strength "childish" involving DIA generals and CIA GS 17's and 18's issuing orders not to inform each other.

Pg. 139 -- OSR's primary subject is military intelligence contrary to NSC directive that DIA is to handle.

Pg. 139 -- OSR's role justified on basis that it takes a strategic view because DOD bogged down in nitty gritty -- is "bureaucratic poppy cock" -- several hundred analysts at CIA and DIA each do exactly same thing.

Pg. 140 -- Real reason for OSR is CIA's reaction to biased reporting by military and CIA feels compelled to keep DIA honest.

Pg. 145 -- CIA since 1961 enamored with making maps of whole world down to 3' to 4' detail, but won't share material with service intelligence until whole project completed.

Pg. 149 -- CIA went to MIT and Harvard for its think tanks.